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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 32

1980

NUMBER 1

BUSINESS LAW
I.

A.

INSURANCE

Bad-Faith Refusal by Insurer to Pay First-PartyBenefits
In Robertsen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Co.,' the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina predicted 2 that the South Carolina Supreme Court
would allow a tort cause of action against an insurers for wrongful failure to pay first-party benefits.4 Although this cause of action was recognized for the first time in the United States only
seven years ago,5 the district court cited the South Carolina Supreme Court's "progressive stance ... on matters affecting personal rights ' 6 and "attitude of substantial concern for the rights
of policyholders treated unfairly by their insurers" 7 in support of
its prognostication that the state court would adopt this theory

1. 464 F. Supp. 876 (D.S.C. 1979).
2. Although "abstention [from deciding unsettled questions of state law] is appropriate under certain circumstances to accommodate delicate considerations of federalstate comity," id. at 878, and "the public will have an interest in the creation of a new
cause of action against first party insurers . . . " id. at 879, the district court concluded
that the issue in this case was not "the type of 'public interest'. . . at. . . which abstention [was] aimed." Id. The court deemed it inappropriate to abstain, even if its decision
might conflict with later state decisions. Id. at 879, 886,n.13.
3. "First party insurance refers to policies which indemnify the insured for a personal loss he has sustained. Third party insurance refers to policies which protect the
insured against liability for injury to the person or property of a third person." Note,
The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor FirstParty Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 164, 164 n.1 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Excess Damages].
4. 464 F. Supp. at 885-86.
5. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
6. 464 F. Supp. at 880.
7. Id. at 885.
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of recovery.'

1. Factual and Procedural Background.-Plaintiff, insured, sought actual and punitive damages in a diversity action
in federal court against his insurer for its alleged bad-faith refusal to pay first-party personal injury protection benefits.9 The
insurer moved to dismiss the action on the jurisdictional ground
that the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000.10 The
amount allegedly due plaintiff for medical expenses under his
insurance policy with defendant was $1,165.05. Plaintiff contended, however, that because of the insurer's wrongful failure
to pay these benefits, he could recover compensatory damages in
excess of the face amount of the policy and, upon a showing of
reckless or willful disregard of his rights, punitive damages. The
district court concluded that, if such a cause of action were allowed, a punitive damages award of $9,000 (approximately eight
times the amount of medical expenses claimed1 1 ) could stand
under South Carolina precedent, 12 thus meeting the amount in
controversy requirement.1 After ruling that South Carolina
bad faith,
would allow recovery under a tort cause of action for
1
4
dismissal.
for
motion
defendant's
denied
the court

2. HistoricalDevelopment.-Traditionally,a suit by an insured against his insurer for failure to pay first-party benefits
was based in contract.1 5 Recovery generally was limited to the

8. When faced with an unsettled question of state law in diversity cases, the Federal
District Court of South Carolina, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), will
"adopt the state's decision-making processes." 464 F. Supp. at 880-81 (citing Gattis v.
Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.S.C. 1976)).
9. Plaintiff's son received medical care valued at $2,165.05 for injuries sustained
while riding his bicycle. The insurance carrier for the motorist causing the injury paid its
full $1,000 personal injury protection benefit and plaintiff sought the balance under his
own policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 464 F. Supp. at
878.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). The amount in controversy must exceed $10,000 to
give the court jurisdiction over a diversity claim. Id.
11. The court assumed that any other types of actual damages claimed by plaintiff
would not be substantial. 464 F. Supp. at 879 n.2.
12. See, e.g., King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 259,,251 S.E.2d 194 (1979)($800
actual damages and $8,700 punitive damages); Thompson v. Home Security Life Ins., 271
S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978)($433 actual damages and $12,500 punitive damages); Norton v. Ewaskio, 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963)($310 actual damages and $3,440
punitive damages).
13. 464 F. Supp. at 880.
14. Id. at 886. See note 49 infra.
15. Note, Insurance-IncreasingLiability for Refusal to Pay First Party Claims:

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss1/4

2

1980]

BUSINESS LAW

Hightower: Business Law

face amount of the policy plus interest.1 The rationale underlying this rule is that, under a contract to pay money, interest is
the only foreseeable damage for delay in payment.1 i This rule
presents a problem; insurance companies are free to delay or
omit payment arbitrarily, with any subsequent liability to the
18
insured limited to the policy amount.
In an attempt to protect the insured against an insurer's
willful delay or unreasonable failure to pay, courts have allowed
recovery greater than the face amount of the policy in various
ways: 19 (1) by extending recovery under the contract to all damages reasonably within the contemplation of the parties; 20 (2) by
permitting recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract
when (a) the insured establishes multiple theories of recovery
such as breach of contract and fraud,2 1 (b) a fraudulent act accompanies the breach of contract, 22 or (c) a fraudulent act induces the signing of the contract; 23 (3) by allowing recovery in

tort for mental anguish and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress; 24 and (4) by recognizing recovery
of compensatory and punitive damages in tort for bad-faith re-

Bad Faith and Punitive Damages, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 685, 690 (1977) [hereinafter

cited as Note, Insurance].
16. E.g., New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378 (1872).
17. Note, Excess Damages, supra note 3, at 167, 181-82; Note, Insurance, supra
note 15, at 690.
18. E.g., Note, Excess Damages, supra note 3, at 164, 167.
19. See generally Parks, Recovery of Extra-ContractDamages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 FORUM 43 (1973); Note, Excess Damages, supra note 3; Note, Insurance,
supra note 15.
20. This entails a liberalization of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854), a rule traditionally construed restrictively. Note, Excess Damages, supra
note 3, at 167-70. See, e.g., Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1967), vacated on rehearing, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321
(1968); Janofsky v. Preferred Ins. Exch., 62 Wash. 2d 801, 329 P.2d 207 (1958).
21. E.g., Ward v. Taggert, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
22. E.g., Thompson v. Home Security Life Ins., 271 S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978).
23. E.g., Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1976); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1968) (fraudulent intent at the time of contracting was inferred from the insurer's failure
to pay benefits); Sharp v. Automobile Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1964).
24. E.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Fletcher
v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). See generally Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the
Tort of IntentionalInfliction of Mental Distress:Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
39 INS. COUNSEL J. 335 (1972).
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fusal to pay benefits. 25 Depending on the particular factual circumstances, the bad-faith tort cause of action may be the only
theory of recovery available to the insured.26
3. The Cause of Action for Bad-Faith Refusal to Pay

First- Party Benefits.-Many jurisdictions,27 including South

Carolina, 28 recognize the tort of bad faith, but restrict its application to actions against insurers for wrongful refusal to settle

with third parties.29 If the insurer has an opportunity to settle a
meritorious third-party claim against the insured for an amount

within the policy limits, but refuses to do so, and the third party
subsequently recovers a judgment against the insured in excess
of the policy limits, the insurer's failure to settle is a breach of

an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 30 Some courts
allow the insured to recover from the insurer the amount of the
excess judgment in a contract action;- others allow recovery in a

tort action, which may include recovery for mental distress.32
Historically, however, courts have been reluctant to imply a

duty of good faith and fair dealing in the first-party context.
The distinction rests on the belief that, in the third-party situation, the insured is in greater need of protection because he has
waived, in favor of the insurer, all rights to settle with and defend against claimants. The insured, however, is no less vulnerable when seeking payment of benefits directly from his insurer;

25. E.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973). See generally Parks, supra note 19; Note, Excess Damages,supra note
3; Note, First Party Torts-Extra-ContractualLiability of Insurers Who Violate the
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,25 DRAKE L. REV. 900 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Note, First Party Torts]; Note, Insurance, supra note 15.
26. When the insurer's conduct does not rise to an outrageous or fraudulent level or
when the insured's mental distress is not severe, the tort of bad-faith refusal to pay
benefits is the only mode of recovery available to the insured. See generally Note, Excess
Damages, supra note 3; Note, First Party Torts, supra note 25.
27. E.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 233 Ark. 1011, 351 S.W.2d
153 (1961); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809
(1967); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Gen-Aero, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
28. Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 374, 120 S.E.2d 217 (1961);
Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
29. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
30. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
31. E.g., Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
32. E.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 233 Ark. 1011, 351 S.W.2d
153 (1961); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
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the insurer controls the settlements in both situations. Thus, a
refusal to impose the same duty in first-party dealings is logically unsupportable. 3
In 1973, the California Supreme Court, in Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.,34 extended the implied duty of good faith

to all insurance contracts and recognized the tort of bad-faith
refusal in the first-party context. A year later, in Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.,3 6 the same court awarded extra-con-

tractual compensatory damages for physical and mental distress
proximately caused by the insurer's unreasonable refusal to pay
benefits. Since Silberg, several other jurisdictions have adopted
this theory of recovery.,

The boundaries of the tort of bad faith in first-party insurance contracts, including the elements of proof and the types of
recoverable damages, have not yet been clearly delineated. The
few cases decided in this area, however, suggest a framework for
the future development of this cause of action. Generally, two
elements must be proved before liability is imposed:
[T]he policyholder must allege and prove both of the following:
(a) That the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying the claim (Here, it is submitted that the court will use the
objective "reasonable man" standard-not whether the defendant thought it had a reasonable basis. This test will probably
turn upon such considerations as [i] whether it was reasonable
to conclude that there had been a proper investigation of the
claim before a decision was made; [ii] whether the results of
such an investigation had been subjected to a fair and reasonable review and evaluation; and [iii] based upon the foregoing,
whether the decision to deny benefits was reasonable.); and (b)
That the insurer denied benefits with knowledge or in reckless
disregard of the fact that7 it had no reasonable basis upon
3
which to deny the claim.

33. But see DuBois & Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party
Actions, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 290 (1973); Comment, Damages:Compensating the Insured
for Injury Resulting From Insurer's Misconduct in Claims Dispositions-IsIt Tort or
Contract?, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 394, 396 (1975).
34. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).

35. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
36. E.g., Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
37. Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith"Is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63, 6768 (1973)(footnotes omitted).
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Although some measure of intent must be shown, proving bad
faith is not burdensome. Courts have found bad faith in a variety of situations. 8
Damages recoverable by the insured under the tort of bad
faith include compensation for losses proximately flowing from
the breach of the duty of good faith, for example, lost earnings,
legal expenses to defend suits brought by creditors, and loss of
an interest in a business."9 Recovery of compensation for mental
distress4 ° and punitive damages, 41 however, is less certain. There
are questions whether mere loss of benefits under the policy, as
opposed to other substantial economic losses suffered, is sufficient to support recovery for mental distress, 42 and whether the
insured can meet the burden of proving that his mental distress
flowed from the insurer's breach rather than the occurrence
causing the original loss. 43 Recovery of punitive damages may

hinge upon the character of the insurer's conduct; intentional or
reckless disregard of the insured's rights should justify a punitive award." Statutes in some jurisdictions limit the recovery of
damages when the insured has acted in bad faith,45 but these
statutes generally are held not to apply to recovery in tort

38. E.g., Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr.
604 (1973)(insurance company refused to pay claim that its counsel advised was valid);

Baque v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 293 (La. Ct. App. 1975)(insurance company engaged in dilatory tactics); Blackburn v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 264 S.C.
535, 216 S.E.2d 192 (1975)(insurer accepted premiums knowing that the policy did not

cover occurrences believed by the insured to be covered). See generally Comment, supra
note 33, at 401-03.
39. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973).
40. See generally Parks & Heil, supra note 37, at 68-71; Note, First Party Torts,
supra note 25, at 910-11. In Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973), the court required corroborating evidence of physical injury or
property loss to support recovery for mental distress.
41. See generally Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Note, First Party Torts, supra note 25, at 911-12.
42. In the cases brought to date, the insureds compensated for emotional harm had
suffered substantial economic losses in addition to damages claimed under the contract.
Cf. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970)
(loss of benefits under the contract sufficient to support recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress).
43. See note 40 supra.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (1977); IDAHO
CODE § 41-1839 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978).
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actions.
Extension of the tort of bad faith to allow recovery under
first-party insurance contracts is justified in order to protect the
insured from an insurer's dilatory tactics. During the evolutionary period of this cause of action, however, courts must carefully
balance the rights of each party so that (1) the insured who actually suffers injury as a result of the insurer's bad faith is compensated, and (2) the insurer can refuse or delay payment without liability whenever reasonable cause for doing so exists.47
4. The District Court's Rationale for PredictingAdoption
of the Tort of Bad Faith in South Carolina.-After noting that
the South Carolina Supreme Court imposes a duty on insurers
to defend and settle in good faith and with reasonable care suits
brought against their insureds,4" the district court addressed the
question of whether the state court would impose a similar duty
on insurers in the first-party context.49 In support of its conclusion that the South Carolina Supreme Court would extend this
duty to first-party claims and allow extra-contractual recovery
for compensatory damages including mental distress and punitive damages, the court cited numerous cases and statutes" and
made a general reference to the state court's "liberal attitude in
the protection and promotion of the rights of individuals against
insurance companies." 51
Under section 38-9-320 of the South Carolina Code, 52 an insurer is liable to the insured for reasonable attorneys' fees upon

46. E.g., Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Busby, 251 Ark. 568, 473 S.W.2d 893 (1971); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809 (1967).
47. At the least, adoption of this cause of action will encourage insurers to improve
their investigation and communication techniques so that claims may be promptly
processed.
48. 464 F. Supp. at 881 (citing, e.g., Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 238
S.C. 374, 120 S.E.2d 217 (1961)).
49. 464 F. Supp. at 881-86. The court limited its holding to extending the duty of
good faith to the specific type of policy (an automobile liability policy providing for personal injury protection benefits) sued on in this case. Id. at 881 n.5. The court stressed
that a strong argument exists for imposing a duty in personal injury protection benefits
cases because the legislature intended for these benefits to be paid without litigation. Id.

at 885. Courts in some other jurisdictions have imposed such a duty in the first-party
context. E.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1970).
50. See 464 F. Supp. at 883-85.

51. Id. at 883.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320 (1976).
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a finding in a suit on the contract that the insurer has refused
without reasonable cause or in bad faith to pay a claim.53 The
final subsection of this statute states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect the Tyger River...
doctrine.154 This doctrine allows an insured in the third-party
context to waive the insurance contract and sue the insurer in
tort for unreasonable refusal to settle or defend. The insured can
recover the amount of the excess judgment against him.55 The
district court, faced with the task of statutory interpretation, decided that by referring to the Tyger River doctrine, rather than
"limit[ing] recovery to attorney's fees in cases not traditionally
covered by Tyger River . . .,[the legislature] intend[ed] to express a 'hands-off' approach to. the future development of the
Tyger River doctrine. ' 58 The court, therefore, felt free to expand
the doctrine to the first-party context "without interference
from the Legislature."5 "
53. Id. This statute provides:
(1) In the event of a claim, loss or damage which is covered by a policy of
insurance or a contract of a nonprofit hospital service plan or a medical service
corporation and the refusal of the insurer, plan or corporation to pay such
claim within ninety days after a demand has been made by the holder of the
policy or contract and a finding on suit of such contract made by the trial
judge of a county court or court of common pleas that such refusal was without
reasonable cause or in bad faith, the insurer, plan or corporation shall be liable
to pay such holder, in addition to any sum or any amount otherwise recoverable, all reasonable attorneys' fees for the prosecution of the case against the
insurer, plan or corporation. The amount of such reasonable attorneys' fees
shall be determined by the trial judge and the amount added to the judgment.
In no event shall the amount of the attorneys' fees exceed one third of the
amount of the judgment of the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars, whichever
is less.
(2) If attorneys' fees are allowed as herein provided and, on appeal to the
Supreme Court by the defendant, the judgment is affirmed, the Supreme Court
shall allow to the respondent such additional sum as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorneys' fees of the respondent on such appeal.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect the Tyger
River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 161 S.E. 491, 163 S.C. 229, doctrine.
Id.
54. Id.
55. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
56. 464 F. Supp. at 882. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted a similar
statute in Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972) and
reached the same result. 464 F. Supp. at 833 n.6. Furthermore, as the court noted in
Robertsen, the language of § 38-9-320 supports this view. Id.
57. 464 F. Supp. at 882.
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In further support of its position, the district court noted
that the courts and the legislature of South Carolina have
demonstrated substantial concern for policyholders who have
been treated unfairly.5 8 The adoption of a bad-faith tort cause of
action in the first-party context in South Carolina would be
merely an extension of the currently recognized Tyger River
doctrine59 and of the cause of action for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.60 Drawing upon South Carolina's
liberal approach to protesting the rights of insureds against their

58. Id. at 883-85. The court noted several situations in which the insured is already
allowed recourse against the insurer, e.g., Boggs v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460,
252 S.E.2d 565 (1979)(in third-party actions, insured can recover the amount of settlement and attorneys' fees, for both negotiating settlement and suing the insurer upon a
finding that the insurer acted unreasonably in denying coverage and failing to defend);
Madden v. Pilot Life Ins. Co,, 272 S.C. 264, 251 S.E.2d 196 (1979)(although recovery was
not allowed on the facts of this case in first-party actions, insured can recover attorneys'
fees if the insurer acted unreasonably in denying a claim); Thompson v. Home Security
Life Ins., 271 S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978)(insured can recover punitive damages from
his insurer if the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act); Moultrie v. North River
Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 53, 249 S.E.2d 158 (1978)(the insured can claim personal injury protection benefits from his own insurer without a set-off for the amount already recovered
from a third party); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
346 (1933) (in third-party actions, the insured can recover the amount of any excess judgment against him in an action against the insurer for bad-faith refusal to settle or defend); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320 (1976)(in first- and third-party contract actions, the
insured can recover attorneys' fees if the insurer acts unreasonably or in bad faith); id. at
§§ 38-37-1110(2), -1120 (by complaining to the Insurance Commission, insured can have
the license of his insurer revoked or a fine imposed for the insurer's failure to pay benefits owed the insured); id. at §§ 38-55-70, -240 (the insured can have the license of his
insurer revoked or a fine imposed for the insurer's misrepresentation concerning an insurance policy during settlement negotiations). See also King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272
S.C. 259, 251 S.E.2d 194 (1979); Middleton v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 273
S.C. 8, 253 S.E.2d 505 (1979); Esler v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 273 S.C. 259, 255
S.E.2d 676 (1979).
The court, however, in Holmes v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d
924 (1979), reiterated its position with regard to recoverable damages in a first-party
contract action. The insured sued the insurer for willfully and wantonly breaching the
terms of a health insurance policy by failing to pay benefits. The court limited the
amount of recoverable damages to those actually stipulated by the policy terms. This
view demonstrates at the least that the court will not alter the standard for recovery in
contract actions. This decision, however, does not preclude the court's expansion of recoverable damages if the cause of action sounds in tort. See 464 F. Supp. at 883-84 n.9
(citing Dawkins v. National Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800 (D.S.C. 1966) and
Hutson v. Continental Assur. Co., 269 S.C. 322, 237 S.E.2d 375 (1977)).
59. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
60. South Carolina is one of few jurisdictions that allows recovery of punitive damages for breach of a contract when the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act. E.g.,
Thompson v. Home Security Life Ins., 271 S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978).
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insurers, the district court concluded that the South Carolina
Supreme Court would recognize, in the first-party context, a
cause of action in tort for "the intentional, reckless, or unreasonable refusal of an insurance company to pay benefits which are
clearly due under the policy."6 " If the insured can demonstrate
such conduct by the insurer he can recover compensatory damages6 2 including damages for mental distress 3 and, upon a showing of recklessness, punitive damages.6 4
5. Conclusion.-Because the district court filed a well-reasoned and well-documented opinion, the South Carolina Supreme Court is likely to embrace the district court's holding in
Robertsen. The novelty and the. indefinite boundaries of this
cause of action, however, may preclude its immediate adoption
in the state. In the interest of policyholders, it is hoped that the
South Carolina Supreme Court will have an early opportunity to
rule on this issue.
B.

Joinder of Insurer as Party-Defendant Under S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-15-20 (1976)

In Davenport v. Summer,6 5 plaintiff sued the insured seeking damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate in an
automobile collision. The lower court granted plaintiffs motion
for joinder of National Grange Insurance Company as a partydefendant, holding that section 15-15-20 of the South Carolina

Code 8 perniits joinder 7 when, as in this case, the liability insur61. 464 F. Supp. at 883.
62. Id. at 883-85 (citing Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1978) and Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 582 F.2d 984 (5th Cir.
1978)).
63. See 464 F. Supp. at 883-84 n.9. In South Carolina, a plaintiff cannot recover
damages for mental distress absent a showing of some physical manifestation of such
distress. See, e.g., Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d
265 (1958). This requirement probably is imposed to ensure that the claimed mental
distress is severe enough to warrant recovery.
64. 464 F. Supp. at 883-85 (citing Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565
(7th Cir. 1978) and Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 582 F.2d 984 (5th
Cir. 1978)). Contra, Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 93 Misc. 2d 59, 403

N.Y.S.2d 389 (1977).
259 S.E.2d 815 (1979).
S.C. -,
65. 66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-20 (1976). This statute provides:
When an indemnity bond or insurance is required by law to be given by a
principal for the performance of a contract or as insurance against personal
injury founded upon tort the principal and his surety, whether on bond or in-
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ance coverage of the defendant-insured is required by the South
Carolina Automobile Reparation Reform Act of 1974.8 On ap-

peal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, with Chief
Justice Lewis filing a strong dissent.
1. Historical Development.-Because of supposed jury
prejudice against insurance companies, plaintiffs commonly seek
to join insurance companies as defendants. Insurers, naturally,
seek to defeat joinder. Traditionally, courts have relied on three
grounds when denying joinder of an insurance company with its
insured tortfeasor: 69 (1) the procedural impropriety of joining a
tort cause of action with a contract cause of action;70 (2) the lack
of privity of contract between the injured plaintiff and the insurer;7 1' and (3) the prejudicial effect of jury notice of insurance
coverage.72
The liberal South Carolina joinder of causes statute" removed the first objection in most insurance cases."4 The other
bases for denial of joinder remained, in South Carolina, however,
until the advent in 1925 of compulsory liability insurance for
common carriers.75 In allowing joinder when liability insurance
was statutorily mandated, courts resolved the lack of privity objection by reasoning that "the contract between insured and insurer is transformed by the statute requiring insurance from a

surance, may be joined in the same action and their liability shall be joint and
concurrent.
Id.
67.

-

S.C. at

-,

259 S.E.2d at 816.

68. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-11-110, -190, -200 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
69. See generally Williams, Shingleton v. Bussey Doctrine: To Join or Not To
Join-This Is the Question, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 418 (1970); Note, Joinderof Motor Vehi-

cle Liability Insurance Companies with the Insured in Tort Cases-UnderSouth Carolina Law When Can They Be Joined?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 461, 462-64 (1954); Comment, Joinder
of Insureras Co-Defendant in Automobile Tort Litigation-Shingletonv. Bussey, 1970
UTAH L. REv. 468.
70. E.g., Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931); Piper v.
American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930).
71. See note 70 supra.
72. E.g., Haynes v. Graham, 192 S.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 903 (1940); Cox v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp., 191 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 549 (1938); Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92
S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1912).
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-10 (1976).

74. E.g., Piper v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930).
75. 1925 S.C. Acts 252, No. 170, § 5 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-910 (1976)).
Additional compulsory insurance provisions are found in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-23-920,
-1220, -1230, -1510 (1976).
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private agreement to one executed primarily for the benefit of
third persons, namely, the injured plaintiff and the public generally and thus enforceable as a third-party beneficiary contract. '76 In addition to being required by statute, an insurance
contract, to be transformed into a contract protecting the injured third person, must indemnify against liability rather than
against loss. A contract indemnifies against liability if the insurer's obligation inures to the benefit of the injured person and
arises at the time the liability attaches to the insured. A contract
indemnifies against loss, however, if the insurer's obligation inures to the benefit of the insured and does not arise until the
insured has suffered a loss through payment of damages.7 7 In answer to the jury prejudice objection courts concluded that
"[s]ince the act was a public act of which every citizen is presumed to have knowledge, the jury could not in such case be
prejudiced by further knowledge that the defendant was thus
'78T
insured.
In 1935, the South Carolina Legislature enacted what is now
section 15-15-20 of the state code.7 9 It is suggested that this joinder statute merely codified the existing common law with regard
to joinder when liability insurance was compulsory. Arguably,
the statutory language, allowing joinder "when. . . insurance is
required by law . . . as insurance against personal injury
founded upon tort . . . ,"8 impliedly incorporates the requirements for such joinder at common law, namely that: (1) the statute mandate insurance coverage that indemnifies against liability, not loss, and that benefits the injured party and the public,
and (2) the causes of action to be joined meet the requirements
of the general joinder of causes statute."1 This view finds support in case law subsequent to the enactment of section 15-15-20
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court used the commonlaw analysis in deciding whether joinder was proper with regard

76. Note, supra note 70, at 464 (citing Piper v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157
S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930)).
77. See, e.g., Piper v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 SC. 106, 154 S.E. 106
(1930).
78. Note, supra note 69, at 463 (footnotes omitted)(citing Benn v. Camel City Coach
Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931)).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-20 (1976). For full statutory text, see note 66 supra.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-20 (1976).
81. Id. § 15-15-10.
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to a particular compulsory insurance statute or ordinance and
did not allow joinder merely because the insurance was statutorily mandated."2
In every case allowing joinder under the statute, the defendant-insured has been a common carrier.8 3 This may be because,
until recently, insurance coverage was statutorily mandated only
for common carriers. Only one other statute approached what
might be regarded as a mandatory requirement. In 1952, the

Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 84 requiring proof of
motorists' financial responsibility under certain circumstances,
was passed. 5 A liability insurance policy was one alternative for
such proof. Although, arguably, joinder was proper under one
portion of the Act," no cases have been found attempting to join
the insurance company as a party-defendant when coverage was
8
required pursuant to this Act. 7
In 1974, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Automobile Reparation Reform Act. 8 Section 56-11-190 of the South
Carolina Code requires all owners of motor vehicles to maintain
security as a condition precedent to automobile registration. 9

82. E.g., Massey v. War Emergency Coop. Ass'n, 209 S.C. 292, 39 S.E.2d 907 (1946);
Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E.2d 489 (1943).
83. E.g., Massey v. War Emergency Coop. Ass'n, 209 S.C. 292, 39 S.E.2d 907 (1946);
Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Burlington Truckers, Inc., 205 S.C. 489, 32 S.E.2d 755 (1944);
Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 203 S.C. 121, 26 S.E.2d 406 (1943); McIntosh v. Whieldon,
205 S.C. 119, 30 S.E.2d 851 (1943).
84. 1952 S.C. Acts 1853, No. 723. This Act was partially repealed by the Automobile
Reparations Reform Act. 1974 S.C. Acts 2718, No. 1177. The remaining provisions of the
1952 Act are codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-10 to -910 (1976).
85. The Act required proof of financial responsibility following revocation of his
driver's license and automobile registration when (1) a party was involved in a motor
vehicle accident resulting in bodily injury, death, or damage to property exceeding fifty
dollars, or (2) a party was convicted of certain offenses. 1952 S.C. Acts 1853, No. 732, §§
5, 17 (the pertinent portions of these sections are presently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§
56-9-450, 7520 (1976)).
86. See Note, supra note 68, at 473-76.
87. Cf. Cox v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 191 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 549 (1938)(unsuccessful attempt to join insurer of private automobile when insurance coverage was not
required by statute).
88. 1974 S.C. Acts 2718, No. 1177 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-11-10 to -800
(1976)).
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-190 (1976). This section states:
Every owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this State shall
maintain the security required by § 56-11-200 with respect to each such motor
vehicle owned by him throughout the period the registration is in effect. No
certificate of registration shall be issued or transferred to an owner by the
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The required security may be a liability insurance policy or another form acceptable to the chief highway commissioner."0 Davenport is the first attempt to join an insurance company as a
party-defendant by reason of this statutorily mandated motor
vehicle insurance.
2. The Court's Rationale for Disallowing Joinder.-In

support of its position that the legislature did not intend to
change the common-law rule disallowing joinder, the court cited
the title and purpose of the Automobile Reparation Reform Act
of 1974.91 Apparently, the court equated the stated purpose of
the Act with legislative intent. Since the legislature did not articulate that its purpose was to permit joinder under the Act,

the court could not infer such an intent if to do so would derogate common-law rights.2 In so ruling, the majority rejected the
lower court's view, apparently based on the absence of any prohibitory language, that the legislature, when considering passage
of the Act, was aware of the joinder statute and intended to permit joinder of the insurance carrier in all motor vehicle collision
cases.9 3 The court also relied on prior case law under the joinder
statute in concluding that the statute applies to joinder only

Chief Highway Commissioner unless the owner or prospective owner produces
satisfactory evidence that such security is in effect.
Id.
90. Id. § 56-11-200. This section states:
The security required under this chapter shall be a policy or policies written by insurers authorized to write such policies in South Carolina providing
for at least (1) the minimum coverages specified in article 7 of Chapter 9 and
(2) the benefits required under §§ 56-11-110, 56-11-120 and 56-11-150; provided, however, that the Chief Highway Commissioner may approve and accept another form of security in lieu of such liability insurance policy if he
finds that such other form of security is adequate to provide and does in fact
provide the benefits required by this chapter.
Id.
91. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 816-17.
92. Id. at -,
259 S.E.2d at 816 (citing Crower v. Carroll, 251 S.C. 192, 161 S.E.2d
235 (1968)).
93. S.C. at -,
259 S.E.2d at 816. The South Carolina Supreme Court would

allow joinder only in the presence of express language in the compulsory insurance statute; the lower court, on the other hand, would have allowed joinder in the absence of
express prohibitory language. The lower court's view that the legislature would expressly
prohibit joinder if it so intended is supported by § 11 of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 1952 in which the the legislature specifically prohibited any reference
to the required security, and thus by implication joinder of the insurer, in any action at
law for damages. 1952 S.C. Acts 1853, No. 723, § 11.
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when the insured is a common carrier.94 This latter argument is
of questionable validity since, as the dissent pointed out, the
"statutory requirements of mandatory insurance ... [were]
unique to common carriers. '' 5 The majority also distinguished
the type of security required as a condition precedent to motor
vehicle registration96 from the type of security required of common carriers.97 In the former situation the security may be an
insurance policy or any other form of security acceptable to the
chief highway commissioner.9 8 As the dissent noted, the court in
a prior case considered this distinction to be without merit because of the public knowledge of the statute.99
Because the dissent's approach focused on a constuction of
the joinder statute rather than the compulsory insurance statute, it is more appealing. Chief Justice Lewis reasoned that the
proper question is whether liability insurance is required by
statute, not whether a common carrier is involved. 100 In answering this inquiry, he concluded that joinder was proper because
the motor vehicle security was statutorily mandated.101
Although the dissent's initial approach is valid, the analysis
under the joinder statute should proceed further. 02 Rather than
to conclude summarily that the insurance is statutorily man-

94. S.C. at -,
259 S.E.2d at 816. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 83-87 and accompanying text supra.
96. S.C. at -,
259 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-200 (1976)).
For full statutory text, see note 89 supra.
97. S.C. -, 259 S.E.2d at 817 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-910 (1976)). This
statute provides:
The Commission shall, in the granting of a certificate, require the applicant to procure and file with the Commission liability and property damage
insurance or a surety bond with some casualty or surety company authorized to
do business in this State on all motor vehicles to be used in the service in such
amount as the Commission may determine, insuring or indemnifying passengers or cargo and the public receiving personal injury by reason of any act of
negligence and for damage to property of any person other than the assured.
Such policy or bond shall contain such conditions, provisions and limitations
as the Commission may prescribe and shall be kept in full force and effect and
failure to do so shall be cause for revocation of such certificate.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-910 (1976).
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-200 (1976). For full statutory text, see note 90 supra.
99. S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 818 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting)(citing Bryant v. Blue
Bird Cab Co., 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E.2d 489 (1943)).
100. S.C. at -,
259 S.E.2d at 818 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
102. See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
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dated, the court should examine the compulsory insurance statute to determine whether it satisfies the common-law requirements for joinder. If, in addition to being statutorily mandated,
the compulsory insurance indemnifies against liability, rather
than loss, and is for the benefit of the public, joinder is
proper. 10 3 The result of such an analysis of section 56-11-200 is
unclear. The liability insurance provision states that the insurance must cover the insured against "loss from the liability imposed by law for damages.' 1104 The uninsured motorist provision,

however, undertakes to pay the insured "all sums which he shall
be legally entitled to recover as damages.'

0

5

Whether these pro-

visions and the provision covering optional medical, hospital,
and disability benefits 06 may be construed as indemnification
against liability and in favor of the public as a third-party beneficiary is open to question. 0 7 It is submitted, however, that any
analysis under the joinder statute must utilize common- law
principles and determine the type of insurance coverage
required. 08
3. Joinderof Insurer in Automobile Tort Actions in Other
Jurisdictions.109 -In Shingleton v. Bussey," 0 the Florida Supreme Court allowed joinder of an insurance company as a
party-defendant regardless of whether the liability insurance
coverage for the operation of a motor vehicle was secured to
meet statutory requirements."" Using public policy considera-

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (1976)(emphasis added).
Id. § 56-9-830.
Id. § 56-11-110 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
See White v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 226 Kan. 191, 596 P.2d 1229 (1979) (con-

strued similar statute as indemnification against loss and disallowed joinder); Comment,
Joinder of Insurer as Co-Defendant in Automobile Tort Litigation-Shingletonv. Bussey, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 468, 469 n.8.
108. See White v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 226 Kan. 191, 596 P.2d 1229 (1979).
109. See generally Rudser, Direct Actions Against Insurance Companies, 45 N.D.L.
REV. 483 (1969); Williams, Shingleton v. Bussey Doctrine:To Join or Not To Join-This

Is the Question, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 418 (1970); Comment, Direct Actions Against Insurance Companies: Should They Join the Party?, 59 CAL. L. REv. 525 (1971); Comment,
Joinder of Insurer as Co-Defendant in Automobile Tort Litigation-Shingleton v. Bussey, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 468; Comment, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance:

Joinderof Insurers as Defendants in Actions Arising Out of Automobile Accidents, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 200 (1978).
110. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See also Ross v. Bowling, 233 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1970).
111. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). The court allowed joinder despite a "no-action"

clause in the insurance contract. See also Williams, Shingleton v. Bussey Doctrine: To
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tions as support, the court concluded that a motor vehicle liability insurance contract is a "'quasi-third party beneficiary contract'. . . giving the injured third party an unquestionable right
to bring direct action against the insurance company as a party
defendant. 11 2 The court weighed heavily the social desirability
of affording the injured person a remedy as quickly and inexpensively as possible."'
Other jurisdictions allow joinder of automobile liability insurers pursuant to direct action statutes." 4 In considering joinder under a statute similar to the South Carolina compulsory
automobile liability insurance statute," 5 however, at least one
state has used a statutory analysis like that suggested above.'1 6
The court in that case construed the statute to require indemnification against loss, rather than liability, and refused to allow
117
joinder.
4. Conclusion.-In refusing to allow joinder of an insurance company as a codefendant in automobile tort litigation, the
South Carolina Supreme Court is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions. Some recognition is being given, however, to the
possibility of such joinder either at common law, pursuant to direct action statutes, or through application of common-law principles to statutory construction of compulsory liability insurance

laws. Courts are beginning to reexamine the policy arguments
advanced against joinder. As Chief Justice Lewis pointed out in
his dissent in Davenport, attempts to avoid jury prejudice
caused by knowledge "would be futile . . . [because insurance
coverage] 'is a public act, and every citizen is presumed to have
public knowledge of it.' ,,118 The desire to avoid a multiplicity of

Join or Not To Join-This Is the Question, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 418 (1970); Comment,
Joinder of Insurer as Co-Defendant in Automobile To-t Litigation-Shingleton v. Bussey, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 468.
112. 223 So. 2d at 715 (citing Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968)).
113. 223 So. 2d at 717-19.
114. E.g., LA. REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 22:655 (West 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.04(2)

(West 1977). See also Comment, The LouisianaDirect Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REV.
243 (1961).
115. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-820, 56-11-190, -200 (1976).
116. White v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 226 Kan. 191, 596 P.2d 1229 (1979).
117. Id.
118. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 818 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting)(citing Benn v. Camel
City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 52, 160 S.E. 135, 138 (1931)).
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suits in the interests of judicial economy and plaintiff resources
is increasing. Although Davenport indicates that the South Carolina Supreme Court is not yet ready to extend joinder to the
automobile tort litigation context, there remains the possibility
that it may do so in the future.
C. Rescission of a PersonalInjury Release on the Ground of
Mutual Mistake Using an "Intent of the Parties" Approach
In Gecy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,119 the
South Carolina Supreme Court adopted an "intent of the par-

ties" approach 2 ' to disallow the rescission of a personal injury
release on the basis of mutual mistake of a material fact. Gecy is
only the third case concerning rescission of a personal injury re121
lease to be brought before the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Although the court had recognized the validity of the mutual
mistake basis for rescission when ruling on a demurrer in
Herndon v. Wright,122 it did not outline the appropriate test for
determining the existence of mutual mistake. In Gecy, the court
accepted the following statement of the law:
"If there is to be avoidance of a release on the ground of
mistake, it must be based upon a finding of unknown injuries
that were in existence and were not within the contemplation
of the parties when the settlement was agreed upon. But if the
parties did in fact intentionally agree upon a 12settlement for unknown injuries, the release will be binding.' '

119. 273 S.C. 437, 257 S.E.2d 709 (1979).
120. Id. at 441-42, 257 S.E.2d at 711. Courts in several other states utilize this approach in determining the proper circumstances for rescission. E.g., Schmidt v. Smith,
299 Minn. 103, 216 N.W.2d 669 (1974); Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203
N.E.2d 237 (1964); Marshall v. Cundiff, 211 Va. 763, 180 S.E.2d 229 (1971). See generally Havighurst, The Effect Upon Settiements of Mutual Mistake as to Injuries, 12
DEF. L.J. 1 (1963); Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960).
121. In Lawton v. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry., 91 S.C. 332, 74 S.E. 750
(1912), the court ruled that a release can be set aside only on the grounds of fraud or bad
faith in the transaction, not for mere mistake. The court, however, in Herndon v. Wright,
257 S.C. 98, 184 S.E.2d 444 (1971), accepted mutual mistake as a basis for rescission and
characterized Lawton as having disallowed rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake, not as having dismissed the validity of the mutual mistake ground altogether. The
fact situation in Gecy is similar to that in Lawton; Gecy thus suggests issues of unilateral
mistake on the part of the plaintiff rather than mutual mistake.
122. 257 S.C. 98, 184 S.E.2d 444 (1971).
123. 273 S.C. at 441, 257 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103,
109, 216 N.W.2d 669, 672 (1974)).
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A determination of the intent of the parties under this test
requires an examination not merely of the wording in the re124
lease, *butof all the circumstances surrounding the settlement.
The intent of the parties is usually a question of fact for the
jury. 2 " In some situations, however, courts that apply this test
may grant a summary judgment. 126 The court in Gecy reversed a
summary judgment for plaintiff and
remanded for entry of a
27
summary judgment for defendant.1

1. Background.-Most personal injury releases contain
broad language expressing an intent to cover both future consequences of known injuries and injuries unknown to the parties at
the time the release is signed that later are found to arise from
the original occurrence. Strict application of the parol evidence
rule and general contract principles regarding the doctrine of
mutual mistake would preclude rescission of a release containing
such a clause. 28 Courts have developed various approaches,

124. E.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103, 109-10, 216 N.W. 2d 669, 673 (1974).
125. E.g., id. at 109, 216 N.W.2d at 672.
126. E.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103, 216 N.W.2d 669 (1974). Those courts
granting summary judgment look to a variety of factors to find intent as a matter of law.
Id. at 109-10, 216 N.W.2d at 673; Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 153, 203
N.E.2d 237, 240 (1964). See text accompanying note 132 infra for a list of these factors.
127. 273 S.C. at 442, 257 S.E.2d at 712.
128. If the parol evidence rule is applied to this unambiguous, albeit broad, language, the wording of the contract would control. Havighurst, supra note 120, at 11.
Even in the absence of such a clause,
[u]nder general principles of contract law, the fact that the existence or
nature of an injury was not known when the release was executed, would not
ordinarily mean that it could be avoided. It is recognized that parties to a bargain are free to allocate the risk of the discovery of unknown facts as well as
the risk of future developments, so that they fall upon one or the other, and
the question of which party takes the risk is simply one of construction of the
contract.
One party is seldom given the right to avoid a bargain on the ground of
mutual mistake with respect to extrinsic facts, even though they are important
in inducing the bargain and in the fixing of its terms. The question in each
instance is whether the fact concerning which the parties were mistaken was
"assumed by them as the basis on which they entered into the transaction."
Otherwise the mistake is regarded as "collateral" and does not affect the obligations of the contract.
Although the broad formulas serving to mark the boundary between basic
and collateral mistake leave consideral room for the exercise of judgment, it
has usually been thought that, when the parties are necessarily aware that
there is doubt with reference to certain matters and make no provision in their
agreement concerning them, each one takes the risk that the true facts when
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however, to avoid application of these rules to releases for personal injuries. 129 Underlying this effort is the judicial realization
that in some situations correction of an injured person's mistake
regarding the extent or existence of his injuries outweighs compliance with both general contract principles and the strong
public policy to encourage the finality of settlements. Even when
courts do rescind on the ground of mutual mistake, however, the
rescission is usually allowed only for injuries not known to be in
existence at the time of the release, rather than for future consequences of known injuries.13 °
2. The "Intent of the Parties" Test.-One approach that
courts use to grant rescission when the release contains a clause
covering all unknown injuries is to focus on the intent of the
parties at the time the release was signed. The question of intent
is for the jury, in light of all the circumstances surrounding the
release. The language of the release is not controlling, but is
merely one factor to be weighed with all other evidence. Courts
have recognized, however, that "the evidence as to finality [of
the release] can be conclusive when the release is executed under
circumstances evincing basic fairness and both releasor and
releasee clearly indicate in the instrument an intent to release

revealed will make his bargain less advantageous than he had thought it to be.
If these principles were applied to the release of a personal injury claim, it
would seem that, in the absence of a reservation in the instrument, it should be
binding even though the injuries later proved to be either more or less serious
than the parties supposed them to be when it was executed.
Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
129. See generally Havighurst, supra note 120, at 3-15; Stephens, Medico-Legal Aspects of Compromise Settlements, 30 MINN. L. REV. 505, 520-26 (1946); Annot., 71
A.L.R.2d 82 (1960). The following cases illustrate some of the approaches used by the

courts: Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1967)(personal injury release can be
set aside when it is inequitable to sustain because the injuries were more serious than
could reasonably have been foreseen by the parties); Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d
171, 176, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1957)(personal injury releases are sui generis and because
of their personal subject matter courts should allow liberal rescission); Aronovitch v.
Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 246, 56 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1953) (parol evidence is admissible to vary
the terms of a written contract in order to show fraud or mistake). Other courts have
allowed rescission for innocent or intentional misrepresentations. See generally Havighurst, supra note 120, at 7-9.
130. E.g., DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1957); Schmidt v. Smith,
299 Minn. 103, 108, 216 N.W.2d 669, 672 (1974). Each party assumes the risk that known
injuries may later be more or less serious.
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all claims for both known and unknown injury."' 31 Factors
courts frequently consider in determining whether to grant a
motion for summary judgment include: (1) the time period between injury and settlement; (2) the time period between settle-

ment and the attempt to avoid the settlement; (3) the existence
of independent medical advice to the plaintiff; (4) the presence
of plaintiff's attorney during negotiation and signing of the release; (5) the language of the release; (6) the adequacy of the
consideration; (7) the competence of the plaintiff; (8) the existence of an injury unknown at the time of the release, rather
than a consequence of a known injury; (9) the extent of negotiation prior to the settlement; and (10) the conclusiveness of the
132
insurer's liability on the claim.

3. The Court's Application of the Test.-In Gecy, defendant appealed the trial court's decision to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in an action to rescind a personal
injury release on the ground of mutual mistake. 3 The South

131. Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103, 109, 216 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1974).
132. E.g., id. at 109-10, 216 N.W.2d at 673; Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St.
149, 153, 203 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1964). Rather than focusing on the specific intent of the
parties, some courts consider whether an inequitable result can be shown. E.g., Ranta v.
Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1967). These courts examine such factors as: (1) the
dignity afforded the person, (2) the inequality of bargaining positions between the injured person and the insurance company, (3) the likelihood of mistakes regarding the
future course of personal injuries, and (4) the amount of consideration received. E.g., id.
at 380, 421 P.2d at 751.
133. 273 S.C. at 439, 257 S.E.2d at 711. The court's summary of the facts states:
On July 26, 1975, the automobile in which Mrs. Gecy was riding was
struck in the rear by an automobile owned by Mr. Harper and driven by his
daughter Carolyn. As a result of the collision Mrs. Gecy sustained personal
injuries to her neck and back.
Mrs. Gecy was treated by Dr. H.L. Laffitte of Allendale who told her she
had suffered neck and back strain that would clear up with time. Dr. Laflitte
referred Mrs. Gecy to Dr. H. Sherman Blalock, an orthopedist, of Augusta,
Georgia. Dr. Blalock confirmed Dr. Laffitte's diagnosis and told Mrs. Gecy that
she had no permanent injuries and that the pain in her neck and back would

eventually go away.
Mrs. Gecy, acting through her attorney Doyet A. Early, III, negotiatied a
settlement with Prudential, the Harpers' insurer. The settlement was negotiated by letter and by telephone. Prudential did not require an independent
medical examination but was furnished with copies of Mrs. Gecy's medical reports. Prudential mailed Mrs. Gecy a release which she and her husband Robert Gecy executed on January 24, 1976. Prudential paid Mr. and Mrs. Gecy
twenty-five hundred ($2500.00) dollars in settlement of their claims against the
Harpers.
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Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
"in view of the parties' agreement that the release would cover
unknown injuries, ' 134 the trial court erred in entering summary
judgment for plaintiff. The court based its decision solely on the
wording of the release, stating that "[w]hile.

.

. equity may look

beyond the wording of the release [to determine intent,] . . .
[plaintiff] did not ask the lower court to exercise its equity
power in this fashion. .

.

. [and plaintiff] neither alleged in her

complaint nor offered evidence to establish that the release was
not intended to cover unknown injuries. 1

35

Notwithstanding

this statement, the court, by its description of the situation surrounding the release, appeared to use the totality of the circumstances approach. 136 The court stressed that (1) the parties had
agreed after deliberate negotiation, (2) plaintiff had her own
counsel during negotiation, (3) plaintiff executed the release
without influence by defendant, and (4) the release plainly
stated that the settlement included coverage of later-discovered
injuries. 131
Mrs. Gecy's problems with her neck and back continued after she executed
the release and in March 1977 she consulted Dr. Kenneth W. Carrington, a
neurosurgeon, of Augusta, Georgia. Dr. Carrington performed a myelogram examination of her spine and diagnosed a ruptured lumbar disc. Dr. Carrington
testified that this was a permanent injury that would possibly require surgical
treatment.
Mrs. Gecy initiated this action in June 1977 to set the release aside on the
ground of mutual mistake of a material fact.
Id. at 439-40, 257 S.E.2d at 710-11.
134. Id. at 442, 257 S.E.2d at 712. The release reads in part as follows:
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
Know all men by these presents, that the Undersigned does hereby acknowledge receipt of two thousand five hundred dollars $2,500.00 which sum is accepted in full compromise settlement of, and as sole consideration for the final
release and discharge of all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that now
exist or may hereafter accure [sic], against Lamar Harper.
The Undersigned Agrees, as a further consideration and inducement for this
compromise settlement, that it shall apply to unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages resulting from said accident, casualty or event, as well as to
those now disclosed.
Id. at 440, 257 S.E.2d at 710-11.
135. Id. at 442, 257 S.E.2d at 712.
136. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
137. 273 S.C. at 442, 257 S.E.2d at 711-12. Other factors in support of the court's
decision can be enumerated as follows: (1) plaintiff signed the release six months after
the injury; (2) plaintiff's attempt to avoid the release occurred two years after the injury
and one and a half years after the execution of the release; (3) physicians chosen by
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Although plaintiff did not specifically request the court to
look beyond the wording of the release, the court's refusal to do

so is disturbing. In the view of the dissent, plaintiff's allegation
of mutual mistake should be construed broadly enough to include a request to go beyond the literal language of the release.13 This reasoning seems sound. The adoption of a totality
of the circumstances approach should be sufficient to allow the
court to go outside the terms of the release sua sponte. Under
the "intent of the parties" approach, the language of the release
is only one factor to be considered, not, as in the majority's
opinion, the controlling factor.' 3 9 The court's summary refusal to
go beyond the terms of the release gives little guidance to future
plaintiffs regarding pleading requirements for the mutual mistake cause of action in this situation.
4. Conclusion.-The court, finding the language of the
final settlement controlling, disallowed rescission of a personal
injury release. A proper application of the "intent of the parties"
test to the particular facts in Gecy would produce the same result. In other factual contexts, however, if all of the circumstances surrounding the settlement show the parties' intent to
be inconsistent with finality, the release should be rescinded
notwithstanding its language. The totality of the circumstances
approach strikes a suitable balance between encouraging finality
of settlements and allowing rescission in those few situations in
which upholding a release is inequitable. Plaintiff's burden to
present evidence of the enumerated factors 40 sufficient to overcome the language of the release is a heavy one. Plaintiff will
succeed in meeting this burden only when enforcement of the
settlement is manifestly unjust.

II. PARTNERSHIP LAW-CAPACITY OF PARTNERSHIP To SUE OR
BE SUED IN ITS OWN NAME
In Marvil Propertiesv. Fripp Island Development Corp.,'
plaintiff conducted the medical examination and defendant relied on these reports without requiring an independent examination. See note 133 supra. In support of the opposite position, however, is the contention that the settlement amount ($2,500) was inadequate to compensate plaintiff for the subsequently discovered injury.
138. 273 S.C. at 444-45, 257 S.E.2d at 713 (Ness, J., dissenting).
139. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
140. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
141. 223 S.C. 619, 258 S.E.2d 106 (1979).
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the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a general partnership does not have the capacity to sue or be sued in its own
name.14 2 Plaintiff, a general partnership, brought suit in the
partnership name, without naming the partners, for specific performance of a sales agreement entered into in the name of the
partnership. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the
ground that plaintiff lacked capacity to sue. The South Carolina
Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed the lower court's overruling
of the demurrer. Justice Littlejohn filed a dissenting opinion. 143
Defendant advanced two arguments in support of its position that a suit can be maintained in the partnership name. The
majority did not expressly respond to the argument that the individual partners are necessary parties. The dissent, however,
concluded that the partners were not necessary parties because
defendant had entered into the contract with the partnership,
not with the individual members, and the rights alleged to have
been violated were partnership rights.1 44 The dissent's position,
at least in the particular factual context of this case, is persuasive and consistent with statute and past decisions. Concededly,
the court previously has expressed the view in dicta that both
the liability on partnership obligations and debts and the right
to enforce obligations and debts running to the partnership are
joint and require joinder of the individual partners as parties. ' 45
Omitting the names of the individual partners in the complaint,
however, does not preclude an entry of judgment in the partnership's favor unless the other party interposes a timely objection
to the omission. 146 To the same effect is section 15-5-510(1) of
the South Carolina Code,147 which allows a judgment to be en142. Id. at 621, 258 S.E.2d at 107.
143. Justice Littlejohn had prepared an opinion to affirm the lower court's ruling. A
majority of the court, however, disagreed with his proposed result and Justice Littlejohn
filed his opinion as a dissent. Id. at 621-23, 258 S.E.2d at 107 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 622, 258 S.E.2d at 107-08 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
145. E.g., Palmetto Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Willson, 257 S.C. 13, 16, 183 S.E.2d 565,
566 (1971); White v. Jackson, 252 S.C. 274, 279, 166 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1966). See also S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (1976).
146. Smith & Melton v. Walker, 6 S.C. 169 (1874); Martin & Cronwell v. Kelly, 25
S.C.L. (Chev.) 215 (1840); Chappell & Cureton v. Procter, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 48 (1823).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-510(1) (1976). This section provides in part:
When the action is against two or more defendants and the summons is
served on one or more of.them, but not on all of them, the plaintiff may proceed as follows:
(1) If the action be against defendants jointly indebted upon contract, he
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forced against the jointly held property and the separately held
property of defendant or defendants served, even though all who
are jointly obligated are not served.1 48 Therefore, at least in an
action to enforce a judgment against the partnership property,
the individual partners are not truly necessary parties.
In Marvil Properties,defendants did make a timely objection by demurrer to plaintiff's failure to name the individual

partners in the complaint. For this reason, the court for the first

time since the Uniform Partnership Act 149 was enacted in South

Carolina in 1950, was faced with resolving the specific issue of a
partnership's capacity to sue. In other jurisdictions that have decided this issue subsequent to the enactment of the Uniform

Partnership Act (UPA), courts have reached conflicting results.

150

Some courts conclude that under the UPA a partnership

is an entity to the extent that it can sue or be sued in the partnership name.1 51 Others embrace the view, as the South Carolina
Supreme Court did in Marvil Properties,that the common-law
rule governs because the UPA is silent on the subject. 15 2
may proceed against the defendant served, unless the court otherwise direct; in
such case if he recover judgment, it may be entered against all the defendants
thus jointly indebted so far only as it may be enforced against the joint property of all and the separate property of the defendant served ....
If the name of one or more partners shall, for any cause, have been omitted in any action in which judgment shall have passed against the defendants
named in the summons and such omission shall not have been pleaded in such
action, the plaintiff, in case the judgment therein shall remain unsatisfied, may
by action recover of such partner separately, upon proving his joint liability,
notwithstanding the fact that such partner may not have been named in the
original action. But the plaintiff shall have satisfaction of only one judgment
rendered for the same cause of action.
Id.
148. Id. Separate recovery, however, is allowed against only those partners who have
been served.
149. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-10, -1090 (1976).
150. See generally R. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.3F (2d ed. 1960); Jensen, Is a PartnershipUnder the Uniform PartnerhipAct an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16
VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963); Note, The Partnershipas a Legal Entity, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
698 (1941).
151. E.g., Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 742-43, 418 P.2d 191,
196 (1966).
152. E.g., Dolph v. Cortez, 8 Ariz. App. 429, 430 n.1, 446 P.2d 939, 940 n.1 (1968). In
Marvil Properties,the South Carolina court noted that the UPA provides: "[iun any case
not provided for in this chapter the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant,
shall govern." 273 S.C. at 621, 258 S.E.2d at 107 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-50
(1976)).
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The majority concluded that neither prior South Carolina
case law nor legislative enactments support the proposition that
a partnership has legal capacity to sue. 15 3 Although the court has
stated in some cases that "a partnership.

. .

is an entity, sepa-

rate and distinct from the persons who compose it,"' ' the court
in Marvil Propertieslimited the application of the entity principle to "determining legal relationships and liabilities of the partners,"' 1 5 and expressly declined to permit "a suit only in the
partnership name."'" 6
The dissent acknowledged that at common law a partnership could not sue or be sued because it was not a legal entity,
but argued that recent legislative enactments and judicial decisions had changed this rule. 157 Although the UPA does not expressly state that a partnership is an entity, several of its provisions suggest that, at least for some purposes, a partnership may
be so viewed. A partnership can own and convey real property in
the partnership name.158 A partnership is liable for the wrongful

acts of its partners. 59 The existence of a partnership continues
despite assignment of a partner's interest. 60 Other South Carolina statutes also support the entity partnership theory. A partnership can register a trademark' 6 ' and a negotiable instrument
can be made payable to a partnership in the firm's name.

62

The

South Carolina Supreme Court has conceded that a partnership
is an entity for certain purposes and that the UPA recognizes
this principle. 163 In Marvil Properties,however, the court was

153. 273 S.C. at 620-21, 258 S.E.2d at 106-07.
154. Id. at 620, 258 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S.C. 262, 267,
1 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1939)). See also Palmetto Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wilson, 257 S.C. 13,
183 S.E.2d 565 (1971); Good v. Jarrard, 93 S.C. 229, 76 S.E. 698 (1912); Bischoff & Co. v.
Blease, 20 S.C. 460 (1884); Congdon, Hazard & Co. v. Morgan, 13 S.C. 190 (1880).
155. 273 S.C. at 620, 258 S.E.2d at 107.
156. Id. The court expressly stated in Smith & Melton v. Walker, 6 S.C. 169, 173
(1874), that a partnership does not have capacity to sue or be sued. But cf. note 146 and
accompanying text infra.
157. 273 S.C. at 621, 258 S.E.2d at 107 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting)(citing White v.
Jackson, 252 S.C. 274, 166 S.E.2d 211 (1969); Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S.C. 262, 1
S.E.2d 162 (1939); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-32(1), -350, 36-3-110, 39-15-110, -130 (1976)).

158. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-230, -320 (1976).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. § 33-41-350.
Id. § 33-41-740.
Id. §§ 39-15-110, -130.
Id. § 36-3-110.
Patterson v. Bogan, 261 S.C. 87, 93, 198 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1973).
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unwilling to extend this line of reasoning by allowing a partnership to sue in the partnership name.
The dissent relied, by analogy, on the reasoning advanced in
Bouchette v. ILGWU Local 371184 to support a partnership's legal capacity to sue. In that case, a unanimous South Carolina
Supreme Court, per Justice Lewis, ruled that an unincorporated
association, under section 15-5-160 of the South Carolina
Code,1 6 5 could be sued in its own name and, under other legislative enactments recognizing the capacity of the ass6ciation to act
in its own name,16 6 could sue in its own name. The court concluded that an unincorporated association could "sue in its own
name in relation to matters affecting the group as a unit. 1 67 Al-

though no statute exists conferring on a partnership the right to
be sued in its own name as was the case for an unincorporated
association in Bouchette, an implication of the right to sue and
be sued arises from other legislative enactments. 6 8 The court in
Marvil Propertiescould have reached the same result as reached
in Bouchette without ruling that a partnership is an entity for
all purposes. The court has stated previously that "[a]n unincorporated association is in no sense a legal entity and is not made
so by the statute [conferring on the association the right to be
sued in its own name]." 1 69 The only difficulty in justifying the
same conclusion in Marvil Propertiesis the difference in the nature of the liabilities of a partnership compared to the liabilities
of an unincorporated association. The obligations of an association are joint and several,17 0 while the obligations of a partner17 1
ship are joint.
The resolution of this issue may hinge ultimately upon practical considerations. It is not always practical in the case of large

164. 245 S.C. 586, 141 S.E.2d 832 (1965).
165. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-160 (1976).
166. 245 S.C. at 590, 141 S.E.2d at 835 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-9-330, 15-35170, 39-15-110 (1976)).
167. 245 S.C. at 591, 141 S.E.2d at 835.
168. See notes 158-62 and accompanying text supra.
169. Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498, 502, 129 S.E. 830, 831
(1925).
170. Id. When liability is joint and several, any one of the obligors may be sued
separately and individually for the full amount of the obligation.
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370(2) (1976). When liability is joint, all obligors must
be sued together in one action and each is liable only for his proportionate share of the
full amount of the obligation.
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accounting, brokerage, or law firms to name all partners, even if
all are known. Pleading captions could run many pages and the
parties to the action could change frequently during the course
of litigation. A partnership should certainly be allowed to sue in
its own name when the rights asserted are partnership rights,
particularly when, as in Marvil Properties, the action is on a
contract entered into in the partnership name and concerns a
sale of property held in the partnership name. Likewise, a partnership should be allowed to be sued in its own name to bind
the partnership property. The safeguard against binding property of individual partners when only the partnership is sued already exists by statute. 17 2 If the partnership being sued has few
assets and plaintiff seeks to bind the property of the individual
partners, the plaintiff can utilize the discovery process to determine the names of the individual partners. Because the court is
reluctant to change the common-law rule, perhaps the legislature should take action to further the ends of commercial
practicability.
Linda L. Hightower

172. Id. § 15-5-510 (1976).
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